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Abstract
An axiomatic formulation of a logic called LPS4 appears in [3]. Here that logic is proved
sound and complete with respect to the weak semantics of [7]. Also a tableau system for LPS4 is
introduced, and also proved sound and complete with respect to the semantics, thus establishing
both cut elimination and equivalence with the axiomatic formulation.
1 Introduction
A provability logic, LP, with explicit proof terms, was presented in [1, 2]. A Kripke-style semantics
for it appears in [5, 7, 6]. Extensions of LP to include a standard modal operator  with S4-like
properties appear in [3]—they are called LPS4 and LPS4−. This paper is concerned with LPS4
only. As with the original LP, the extensions were given arithmetic semantics. It is the purpose
of this report to do the following. First, it will be shown that the axiom system for LPS4 from [3]
is actually complete with respect to the weak semantics of [7], thus answering Problem 1 from [3].
Second, a tableau system for LPS4 will be presented. It will be shown to be sound and complete
with respect to the weak semantics of [7], establishing its equivalence with the axiomatic version,
and also demonstrating cut-elimination (non-constructively). For convenience I will begin with
brief summaries of the logic LPS4 axiomatically, and of the weak semantics being used.
2 The logic LPS4 axiomatically
I begin with the language. This is largely taken from [3].
Proof polynomials for LPS4 are terms built from proof variables x, y, z,. . . and proof constants
a, b, c,. . . by means of three operations, application “·” (binary), union “+” (binary), and proof
checker “!” (unary).
Using t to stand for any proof polynomial and S for any sentence variable, formulas are defined
by the grammar
A = S | ⊥ | A1 ⊃ A2 | A | t:A
A constant specification is a mapping C from proof constants to sets of formulas (possibly
empty). A formula X has a proof constant with respect to C if X ∈ C(c) for some proof constant
c. A proof constant c is for a formula X if X ∈ C(c).
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The logic of explicit proofs and implicit provability, LPS4, has axioms of both LP and S4, a
specific principle connecting explicit proofs with , and rules Modus Ponens and Constant Speci-
fication as shown below. Let C be a constant specification.
Classical propositional logic A standard set of axioms, and rule R1. Modus Ponens
Basic Epistemic Logic S4 The following axiom schemes and rule.
E1 (X ⊃ Y ) ⊃ (X ⊃ Y ) (implicit application)
E2 X ⊃ X (implicit proof checker)
E3 X ⊃ X (reflexivity)
R2 ⊢ X ⇒ ⊢ X (necessitation rule)
LP The following axiom schemes and rule.
LP1 s:(X ⊃ Y ) ⊃ (t:X ⊃ (s · t:)Y ) (application)
LP2 t:X ⊃!t:(t:X) (proof checker)
LP3 s:X ⊃ (s+ t):X, t:X ⊃ (s+ t):X (union)
LP4 t:X ⊃ X (explicit reflexivity)
R4 ⊢ c:A where A is an axiom and A ∈ C(c) (constant specification rule)
Connecting principle
C1 t:X ⊃ X (explicit-implicit connection)
A formula X has an LPS4 axiomatic proof using constant specification C if X is provable using
the axioms and rules above, where C is the constant specification used in R4.
Note the omission of a rule numbered R3. This is to maintain correspondence with the num-
bering in [3]. Axiom LP4 can be proved from the others, but is kept to maintain the relationship
with the usual formulation of LP.
A principle called positive introspection in [3] has an easy proof in this system: t:X ⊃ t:X. It is
mentioned because it will be needed when we come to tableaus. There is a corresponding principle
of negative introspection: ¬(t:X) ⊃ ¬(t:X), which is not provable. Adding it to LPS4 yields the
system called LPS4− in [3]. It is actually LPS4− that has the natural arithmetic semantics, but
I do not pursue this issue here.
3 Weak Semantics
A semantics for LP was given in [5] and, in more detail in [7]. There are actually two versions, a
weak and a strong. It is the weak version that is needed now, and a sketch of it follows.
F = 〈G,R〉 is a frame in the usual sense, where G is a set of states and R is a binary relation
on G. Given the frame F , a possible evidence function E is a mapping from states and proof
polynomials to sets of formulas. Here are the conditions that must be met by E to be an evidence
function with respect to constant specification C:
E is an evidence function on 〈G,R〉 if, for all proof polynomials s and t, for all formulas X and
Y , and for all Γ,∆ ∈ G:
1. Application (X ⊃ Y ) ∈ E(Γ, s) and X ∈ E(Γ, t) implies Y ∈ E(Γ, s · t).
2. Monotonicity ΓR∆ implies E(Γ, t) ⊆ E(∆, t).
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3. Proof Checker X ∈ E(Γ, t) implies t:X ∈ E(Γ, !t).
4. Sum E(Γ, s) ∪ E(Γ, t) ⊆ E(Γ, s+ t).
A structure M = 〈G,R, E ,V〉 is a weak LP model provided 〈G,R〉 is a frame with R reflexive
and transitive, E is an evidence function on 〈G,R〉, and V is a mapping from propositional variables
to subsets of G.
Given a weak model M = 〈G,R, E ,V〉, a forcing relation is defined by the following rules. For
each Γ ∈ G:
1. M,Γ  P for a propositional variable P provided Γ ∈ V(P ).
2. M,Γ  ⊥ never holds—written Γ 6 ⊥.
3. M,Γ  (X ⊃ Y ) if and only if M,Γ 6 X or M,Γ  Y .
4. M,Γ  (t:X) if and only if X ∈ E(Γ, t) and, for every ∆ ∈ G with ΓR∆, M,∆  X.
We say X is true at world Γ if M,Γ  X, and otherwise X is false at Γ.
Let M = 〈G,R, E ,V〉 be a weak LP model. And let C be a constant specification meeting the
condition that any formula having a proof constant with respect to C must be true at every possible
world of every weak LP model. Then M is a weak LP model that meets constant specification C
provided C(c) ⊆ E(Γ, c), for each Γ ∈ G.
All of the definitions above were for LP, and were taken from [5]. Now this is extended to
LPS4. For this we simply need to do two things. First, the language is extended to include ,
with all conditions stated above applying to the enlarged language. Second, the forcing conditions
are extended in the familiar way:
5. M,Γ  X if and only if M,∆  X for every ∆ ∈ G such that ΓR∆.
4 Axiomatic Soundness and Completeness
Theorem 4.1 A formula X (in the language of LPS4) has an LPS4 axiomatic proof using con-
stant specification C if and only if X is true at all worlds of LPS4 models meeting constant speci-
fication C.
The soundness half of this Theorem is quite straightforward, and is omitted—see Theorem 8
in [3]. As it happens, the completeness half is quite straightforward, being a direct combination of
standard canonical arguments for S4, and for LP from [5, 7]. I will sketch the details.
Let C be a constant specification, fixed for the following construction. Axiomatic proofs are
assumed to use this constant specification C.
Call a set S of LPS4 formulas inconsistent if there is some finite subset {X1, . . . ,Xn} ⊆ S such
that (X1 ∧ . . . ∧Xn) ⊃ ⊥ is a theorem of LPS4 (with ∧ defined from ⊃ and ⊥ in the usual way).
Call S consistent if it is not inconsistent. Consistent sets extend to maximal consistent sets, via
a standard Lindenbaum Lemma construction. Let G be the set of all maximally consistent sets of
formulas. If Γ ∈ G, let Γ♯ = {X | X ∈ Γ}, and set ΓR∆ if Γ♯ ⊆ ∆. This gives us a frame, 〈G,R〉.
It is obviously reflexive and transitive. Define a mapping E by setting E(Γ, t) = {X | t:X ∈ Γ}.
Finally, define a mapping V by specifying that for an atomic formula P , Γ ∈ V(P ) if and only if
P ∈ Γ. This gives us a structure M = 〈G,R, E ,V〉. The claim is that M is an LPS4 model that
meets C.
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First I’ll verify two of the conditions or the evidence function E—other conditions are similar.
I’ll begin with the Application Condition. Suppose we have X ∈ E(Γ, t) and (X ⊃ Y ) ∈ E(Γ, s). By
the definition of E , we must have t:X ∈ Γ and s:(X ⊃ Y ) ∈ Γ. Since s:(X ⊃ Y ) ⊃ (t:X ⊃ (s · t):Y ) is
an LPS4 axiom, and Γ is maximally consistent, it follows that (s·t):Y ∈ Γ, and hence Y ∈ E(Γ, s·t).
Next, I’ll verify the Monotonicity Condition. Suppose Γ,∆ ∈ G and ΓR∆. Also assume
X ∈ E(Γ, t). By definition of E , we have t:X ∈ Γ. Now t:X ⊃!t:t:X is an LPS4 axiom (LP2), and
so is !t:t:X ⊃ t:X (C1 ), so we have t:X ∈ Γ, and hence t:X ∈ Γ♯. Since ΓR∆ we have Γ♯ ⊆ ∆,
so t:X ∈ ∆, and so t:X ∈ ∆, using E3, and so X ∈ E(∆, t).
Other conditions are similar. Thus M is an LPS4 model that meets C.
Now a Truth Lemma can be shown: for each formula X and each Γ ∈ G
X ∈ Γ⇐⇒M,Γ  X (1)
Most of the cases are familiar from standard S4 completeness proofs. I’ll verify only one case.
Suppose (1) is known for X, and we are considering the formula t:X.
Suppose first that t:X ∈ Γ. Then, using axiom C1, t:X ⊃ X, X ∈ Γ, and so X ∈ Γ♯. Then
if ∆ is an arbitrary member of G with ΓR∆ we have Γ♯ ⊆ ∆ and hence X ∈ ∆, and so X ∈ ∆,
using E3. By the induction hypothesis, M,∆  X. Also since t:X ∈ Γ, we have X ∈ E(Γ, t). It
follows that M,Γ  t:X.
Next, suppose M,Γ  t:X. This case is trivial. By the general definition of  we must have
X ∈ E(Γ, t), and by definition of E for M, we must also have t:X ∈ Γ.
Thus we have the Truth Lemma. Now, as usual, if X does not have an LPS4 axiomatic proof,
{X ⊃ ⊥} is consistent. Extend it to a maximal consistent set Γ. Then Γ ∈ G and by (1)M,Γ 6 X.
Thus axiomatic completeness has been established.
5 Tableaus
I give a tableau system for LPS4, divided into subsystems. The classical part is from [10]. The S4
part appears in several places, ranging from [4] to [8]. The LP rules are from [9, 7]. It is assumed
that the language is that for LPS4, as earlier.
A signed formula is T X or F X, where X is a formula of LPS4. A tableau proof of X is
a closed tableau for F X. A tableau for F X is a tree, with F X at the root, constructed using
certain branch extension rules to be given in a moment. A tableau is closed if each branch is closed,
and a branch is closed if it contains an explicit contradiction, T Z and F Z for some formula Z,
or T ⊥ (there will be one additional closure condition below). What remains is to say what the
branch extension rules are. These fall into two categories: those that extend branches (known as α
rules) and those that cause branches to split (known as β rules). Since we have only one classical
connective to consider, there is only one classical rule of each type, given in Table 1. These are
non-deterministic rules—one may freely choose which signed formula on a branch to apply a rule
to.
F X ⊃ Y
T X
F Y
T X ⊃ Y
F X T Y
Table 1: Classical Tableau Rules
Next are the LP rules, in Table 2. Note that the branching rule violates the usual tableau
subformula principle.
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T t:X
T X
F !t:(t:X)
F t:X
F (s+ t):X
F s:X
F (s+ t):X
F t:X
F (t · s):Y
F t:X ⊃ Y F s:X
Table 2: LP Tableau Rules
I said there would be one more closure condition—now it is time for it. Let C be a constant
specification. I’ll say X has an LPS4 tableau proof using C if it has a proof using the machinery
above together with the additional rule: a branch closes if it contains F c:Z where Z ∈ C(c). As far
as we have gone, we have a sound and complete system for LP.
For S4 machinery, I will use what are called destructive rules. These modify branches by
removing formulas. For this, it is convenient to define the following operation. If S is a set of
signed formulas, let S♯ = {T X | T X ∈ S}. Now, the S4 rules are in Table 3.
T X
T X
S,F X
S♯, F X
Table 3: S4 Tableau Rules
For Table 3, the first rule is straightforward. The second is the destructive one. If F X occurs
on a tableau branch, with S being the set consisting of the other formulas on the branch, the branch
may be replaced with a new branch consisting of S♯ and F X. Non-necessary formulas disappear.
We need something to connect the LP part with the S4 part. This is in Table 4. It does make
one of the LP rules redundant, but never mind that.
T t:X
T X
Table 4: Connecting Rule
It would be nice if the system just presented were complete for LPS4, but I do not believe it is
(though I have no proof of this). I need one more item for a completeness proof. One can introduce
assumptions or premises into tableau proofs. These come in two varieties, local and global. Never
mind the details of the distinction just now—I need to take the positive introspection formulas as
global assumptions. This means they can be used (with a sign of T ) at any point of a tableau
construction. This is summarized in Table 5.
6 Soundness and Completeness
Soundness says: if X has a tableau proof using constant specification C then X is true at every
world of every LPS4 model meeting C. It is proved by a standard argument. Call a set of signed
formulas S satisfiable if there is an LPS4 model M meeting C, and a possible world Γ of it, such
that T X ∈ S =⇒M,Γ  X and F X ∈ S =⇒M,Γ 6 X. Call a tableau satisfiable if the set of
signed formulas on some branch is satisfiable. The key thing to show is: any tableau rule applied to
a satisfiable branch yields another satisfiable branch. I omit the argument. Now, suppose X has a
tableau proof using constant specification C, but there is a modelM meeting constant specification
C, and a world Γ of it such that M,Γ 6 X. Then the set {F X} is satisfiable, so the tableau
construction begins with a satisfiable tableau. Every subsequent tableau must be satisfiable. So
there must be a closed, satisfiable tableau, and this is not possible.
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T t:X ⊃ (t:X)
Table 5: Positive Introspection Rule
The completeness argument is more work. From now on, we allow a tableau to start with a finite
set of signed formulas, instead of with a single one. The order in which these formulas are added
to the initial branch does not matter. Let C be a constant specification, fixed for the rest of the
section. Call a set S (not necessarily finite) tableau consistent if there is no closed tableau beginning
with any finite subset of S, using C. By the usual Lindenbaum argument, tableau consistent sets
extend to maximal ones.
Suppose S is maximally tableau consistent, and Z ∈ S for some signed formula Z. If Z is
one of the signed formulas above the line in a non-branching, non-destructive rule in Table 1, 2,
3, 4, or 5, each signed formula below the line in that rule is also in S. As a typical example, if
F (s + t):X ∈ S, then we should also have F s:X ∈ S. Well if not, since S is maximally tableau
consistent, S ∪ {F s:X} must not be tableau consistent, and hence there is a closed tableau for a
finite subset, say {Z1, . . . , Zn, F s:X}. But {Z1, . . . , Zn, F (s + t):X} is a finite subset of S itself,
and there is a closed tableau for it, since we can make the first move in the tableau construction
the addition of F s:X using a tableau rule from Table 2, and then proceed as we did in the closed
tableau for {Z1, . . . , Zn, F s:X}. In a similar way, if Z is one of the signed formulas above the line
in a branching rule, and Z ∈ S, then one of the two formulas below the line in that rule is in S.
Note that since the rule in Table 5 has no premise, all instances of positive introspection will be in
S.
Construct a weak LPS4 model as follows. Let G be the collection of all maximal tableau
consistent sets. For Γ,∆ ∈ G, let ΓR∆ provided Γ♯ ⊆ ∆. Let X ∈ E(Γ, t) provided F t:X /∈ Γ. And
let Γ ∈ V(P ) provided T P ∈ Γ, for a propositional letter P . This gives us a modelM = 〈G,R, E ,V〉.
I’ll check two cases of the verification that E is an evidence function, beginning with the Sum
condition. Suppose X /∈ E(Γ, s + t); I’ll show X /∈ E(Γ, s). But this is easy. It amounts to saying
F (s + t):X ∈ Γ implies F s :X ∈ Γ and, as we saw above, this is the case since Γ is maximal,
and we have the Sum rules. Next I’ll consider the monotonicity condition. Suppose ΓR∆ and
X ∈ E(Γ, t); I’ll show X ∈ E(∆, t). By the definition of E we have F t :X /∈ Γ. But using the
Positive Introspection Rule, T t:X ⊃ t:X ∈ Γ, so either F t:X ∈ Γ or T t:X ∈ Γ. Then we must
have T t:X ∈ Γ. Since ΓR∆, then Γ♯ ⊆ ∆, so T t:X ∈ ∆. It follows from one of the S4 rules
that T t:X ∈ ∆. Since ∆ is tableau consistent, we must have F t:X /∈ ∆, and so X ∈ E(∆, t).
Clearly R is reflexive and transitive. And obviously M meets constant specification C since no
set containing F c:X is tableau consistent, where X ∈ C(c). We thus have that M is an LPS4
model that meets C.
The main thing now is a version of the Truth Lemma appropriate for tableaus. Unlike the
earlier axiomatic version, it takes the form of two implications instead of an equivalence. For each
Γ ∈ G and formula X:
T X ∈ Γ =⇒M,Γ  X (2)
F X ∈ Γ =⇒M,Γ 6 X (3)
The proof is by induction on the degree of X. Most of the cases are straightforward—I’ll consider
the modal cases in detail. Assume (2) and (3) are known for Z.
As one case, consider t:Z. Suppose first that T t:Z ∈ Γ. Since Γ is tableau consistent, F t:Z /∈ Γ
and so Z ∈ E(Γ, t). Using the Connecting Rule from Table 4, T Z ∈ Γ. Let ∆ be an arbitrary
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member of G with ΓR∆. By definition of R, T Z ∈ ∆, and using one of the S4 rules from
Table 3, T Z ∈ ∆. By the induction hypothesis, item (2) gives us M,∆  Z. Since ∆ was
arbitrary, M,Γ  t:Z.
Next, suppose that F t:Z ∈ Γ. Then Z /∈ E(Γ, t), so trivially M,Γ 6 t:Z.
As another case, consider Z. Suppose that T Z ∈ Γ. If ΓR∆, then Γ♯ ⊆ ∆, so T Z ∈ ∆.
Then by one of the S4 rules, T Z ∈ ∆. By the induction hypothesis, M,∆  Z. Since ∆ was
arbitrary, M,Γ  Z. Next, suppose that F Z ∈ Γ. The set Γ♯ ∪ {F Z} is easily seen to be
tableau consistent, using one of the S4 rules. Extend it to a maximal tableau consistent set, ∆.
Then ∆ ∈ G, ΓR∆, and by the induction hypothesis, M,∆ 6 Z. Hence M,Γ 6 Z.
With the tableau version of the Truth Lemma established, completeness is as usual. If X does
not have a tableau proof, {F X} is tableau consistent. A maximal extension of this set will be a
member of G at which X is false.
7 Comments and Conclusions
It has now been established, via equivalence with a semantics, that the axiomatic and the tableau
formulations of LPS4 are equivalent. As usual, soundness and completeness of the tableau system
(together with soundness of a cut rule) establish cut elimination non-constructively. Treating
Positive Introspection as assumptions is contrary to the usual nature of tableaus. On the other
hand, the tableau rule for multiplication already violates the usual tableau subformula principle.
It should be noted that Positive Introspection instances can be proved using the tableau rules,
without the need for taking them as assumptions. The problem is, to make use of this in other
tableau arguments, we need a cut elimination principle, which we seem not to have unless we
strengthen the system by treating Positive Introspection as we did. I conjecture that, without the
rule of Table 5 the tableau system is not complete, and cut elimination does not hold. It should
be noted, however, that the Positive Introspection Rule is, itself, a form of cut elimination. As a
referee pointed out, instead of a simple cut on X, it amounts to a cut between t:X and t:X.
Soundness and completeness have been established for what amounts to LP + S4, both ax-
iomatically and using tableaus. But weaker logics can be considered as well (see Section 10 in [7]).
As one example, if we drop axiom schemes E2 and LP2, completeness can be shown with respect
to models in which R need not be transitive, and in which E is not required to be monotonic, or
to satisfy the proof checker condition (conditions 2 and 3). For tableaus, we drop the rule for “!”,
and most importantly we drop the rule from Table 5. It is transitivity that seems to force Positive
Introspection on us. This needs to be better understood.
Finally, many people are happier with sequent-style rules instead of tableau rules. For the
convenience of these, I give a sequent-style formulation that is equivalent to the tableau system
of Section 5. In it, σ, with or without subscripts, denotes a finite sequence of formulas of LPS4,
possibly empty. Also σ♯ is the sequence that results when all formulas are deleted from σ except
those of the form Z. and σ♭ is the sequence that results when all formulas are deleted except
those of the form Z ⊃ ⊥ (abbreviated by ¬Z).
Let C be a constant specification, fixed for the following. In addition to structural rules, which
I omit, we have the following.
Axioms Z −→ Z ⊥ −→ −→ c:Z, provided Z ∈ C(c)
Classical Rules
σ1,X −→ σ2, Y
σ1 −→ σ2,X ⊃ Y
σ1 −→ σ2,X σ1, Y −→ σ2
σ1,X ⊃ Y −→ σ2
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LP Rules
σ1 −→ σ2, t:(X ⊃ Y ) σ1 −→ σ2, s:X
σ1 −→ σ2, (t · s):Y
σ1 −→ σ2, s:X
σ1 −→ σ2, (s + t):X
σ1 −→ σ2, t:X
σ1 −→ σ2, (s + t):X
σ1,X −→ σ2
σ1, t:X −→ σ2
σ1 −→ σ2, t:X
σ1 −→ σ2, !t:(t:X)
S4 Rules
σ1,X −→ σ2
σ1,X −→ σ2
σ♯
1
−→ σ♭
2
,X
σ1 −→ σ2,X
Connecting Rule
σ1,X −→ σ2
σ1, t:X −→ σ2
Positive Introspection Rule
σ1, t:X ⊃ X −→ σ2
σ1 −→ σ2
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